Notice how the U.S. gov't media claims WikiLeaks is being attacked by hackers:
Joni Simonshvili
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/WikiLeaks-Site-Under-Attack-Again-Promises-Major-Release-on-US-Bank--111049494.html The thing is, "hackers", as in "computer hackers" that target major corporations and governments, would be *on* the side of WikiLeaks, not the other way around, as the VOA claims. The only side that would be "hacking" wikileaks is the gov't. If "hackers" are doing it, then they are employed by the U.S. gov't. Oh, by the way, wasn't the "U.S. government" [supposed] to have been governed by 'the people'? When, why, and how did it become the enemy of 'the people'?This all reminds me of Goldstein and 1984 - the present system of siddemination of information to the public – not only in the US but internationally more closely resembles the Orewellian state, where misinformation and disinformation are deliberately broadcasted in the former of a "Newspeak" language, which has been stripped bare of any political content.
In many parts of the world, as in Egypt, Georgia and Azerbaijan (to name just a few) – many media outlets operate out of fear – if they are now operating at all under the former business model. Take for instance in Georgia with Georgian Public TV and Rustavi2, both considered as official mouthpieces of the state. They are actively involved in conveying the government's official perspective – devoid of actual news and commentary.
Even the recent WikliLeak story is not totally understood - as thus far, extensive redaction and blanking out the names of State Dep's informants in Tbilisi, on the grounds that it would endanger the lives of their assets, is commonplace – and without more openness – the impact in actually being able to change US foreign policy will be limited.
Wikileaks hasn't really started publishing yet. From what I've heard of interviews with editors of the NYT and others, there is a dialogue process where Assange & co gets advice from newspapers about how much to redact. The Times advised Wikleaks to redact the names of informants from NGOs and media. Therefore, nobody should expect who to know who the spies and murderers of PM are in Tbilisi and other places in the world.
cablegate.wikileaks.org georgia
China's ambassador to Kazakhstan, Cheng Guoping, thought in June last year that Russia will use military force to overthrow Saakashvili, and that Burjanadze will become next president. He says Condi Rice encouraged Saakashvili to attack:http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09ASTANA982.html
Netanyahu on arms deals with Georgia and S-300: http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10MOSCOW392.htmlSome things just don't add up, and as one American shared recently, "come on man, these are little bon bons that were combed over by intel before being released by intel to their little monkey op, Julian Assange.
There are many reasons to conclude that WikiLeaks is a CIA/NSA controlled leak operation. Here are just a few:
1. WikiLeaks curator Assange is a free man. The U.S. black-bags people around the country with no evidence whatsoever on some vague suspicions of anti-U.S. behavior or sentiments. Revokes passports of US citizens, Yet, while claiming Assange has leaked classified military information, Assange has not even been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury. 2. The U.S. could easily seize Assange's computers and also has the technical ability to shut off access to his sites, but that hasn't happened. 3. The U.S. has the ability to track every breath Assange takes, but has not definitively discovered Assange's sources. 4. It is VERY unlikely that a PFC (or any other single individual) would have access to the wide variety of data attributed to one individual source in each of these major leaks, let alone the ability to remove that data from military computer systems. 5. The WikiLeaks disclosures are obviously "cleaned" -- they lack anything truly sensational, including the types of sensational information that close observers know to exist.S E C R E T STATE 015856 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2035 TAGS: ETTC MARR MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER MASS TU IRSUBJECT: (S) TURKISH FIRMS ENGAGED IN MILITARY MATERIEL-RELATED DEALS WITH IRAN Classified By: EUR/PRA Director Stephanie Miley ¶1. (U) This is an action request to Embassy Ankara. Please see paragraph 7. ---------- BACKGROUND ---------- ¶2. (S) The U.S. has information about several transactions involving Turkish firms planning to export and import from Iran arms and related material controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement. Specifically, Iran is interested in procuring Full Metal Jacket (FMJ) .38 caliber and wadcutter bullets; 40 mm automatic grenade launchers; 5.56 mm composite magazines (for M16 assault rifles), and 7.62 X 39 mm and 7.62 X 51 mm composite magazines from Turkey. In addition, we understand that a Turkish firm may also be pursuing a deal to import plastic explosives and nitrocellulose from Iran. ¶3. (S) The U.S. wants to provide this information to Turkish officials, request that they investigate this activity and use all available means to prevent these firms from exporting and importing such arms to and from Iran. In addition to any domestic Turkish authorities that may apply, these activities may also be in violation of both United Nations Security Resolution (UNSCR) 1747 and U.S. domestic authorities. ¶4. (S) UNSCR 1747: UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory any "arms or related materiel." It also requires all states to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran. The procurement of plastic explosives from Iran would violate UNSCR 1747. ¶5. (S) The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA): INKSNA authorizes sanctions against any foreign person that transfers to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria goods, services, or technology controlled by multilateral control lists (e.g., Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, or Wassenaar Arrangement); of the same kind as those on multilateral control lists, but falling below the control list parameters, when it is determined that such goods, services, and technologies have the potential to make a material contribution to WMD, or cruise or ballistic missile systems; on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that are not on multilateral lists; or with the potential of making a material contribution to WMD, or cruise or ballistic missile systems. Accordingly, the U.S. is concerned that if the Turkish firms proceed with transferring the grenade launchers, bullets, and ammunition magazines, we would be required to report this to the U.S. Congress and the Turkish firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions. ¶6. (S) The U.S. is also concerned about the potential exports to Iran because one of the items may be of U.S. origin. According to Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) records, Turkey received 181 MK-19 40 mm grenade launchers from the United States in 1995. However, we do not know definitively if any of these are among the 40 mm grenade launchers contemplated as part of the sale to Iran. We note, however, that if any U.S.-origin defense equipment (including technical data) is re-transferred to Iran, that would violate Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). As a consequence, Turkey could lose its country eligibility under the AECA to purchase or lease defense articles, including Patriot or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or services, or to receive credits or guarantees relating to any purchase or lease. ------------------------- ACTION REQUEST/OBJECTIVES ------------------------- ¶7. (S) Post is requested to approach GOT officials to pursue the following objectives and to deliver the talking points/non-paper in paragraph 8 below as appropriate: -- Thank Turkish officials for Turkey's continued cooperation and support in preventing the transfer of arms or related material to and from Iran; -- Inform the GOT that we are very concerned that Turkish firms may be exporting to and importing from Iran arms and related material; -- Note that the export of Wassenaar Arrangement controlled items to Iran could require a report to the U.S. Congress under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) and may result in sanctions being imposed on the entities and individuals involved; -- Point out that the import of arms or related material from Iran would violate UNSCR 1747, which prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory any "arms or related materiel" and requires all states to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals; -- Emphasize this is not the time for business as usual with Iran; -- Remind the GOT that both the DIO and Parchin were designated for an asset freeze under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, respectively, and were sanctioned by the U.S. under Executive Order (E.O.) 13382; -- Strongly urge the GOT to use available legal authorities, including appropriate domestic laws and authorities related to implementing UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, to immediately terminate these deals and freeze any assets of DIO; -- Note that Iran has a long history of providing arms and other military equipment to terrorist groups and that these items could easily end up in the hands of al-Qaida, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Taliban; -------------- TALKING POINTS -------------- ¶8. (S//REL TURKEY) Begin talking points: -- We appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued cooperation and support in preventing the transfer of military equipment and related materiel to and from Iran. -- In the spirit of this cooperation, we want to share with you some additional information about Turkish firms involved in dealings concerning arms and related materiel with Iran. --------------- EXPORTS TO IRAN --------------- -- We have information that the Turkish firms Mercan Tanitim Dis Ticaret ve Muhendislik Ltd. and Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) may sign a contract to export military material to Iran. -- The items covered by the contract include: FMJ (Full Metal Jacket) .38 caliber and wadcutter bullets; 40 mm automatic grenade launchers; 5.56 mm composite magazines (for M16 assault rifles), and 7.62 X 39 mm and 7.62 X 51 mm composite magazines, all of which are specified on the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List. -- In addition, according to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) records, Turkey received 181 MK-19 40 mm grenade launchers from the United States in 1995. We do not know, definitively, if any of these were among the 40 mm grenade launchers contemplated as part of the sale to Iran. -- We should note, however, that if any U.S.-origin defense equipment (including technical data) is re-transferred to Iran, that transfer would violate Section 3 of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act (AECA). As a consequence, Turkey could lose its country eligibility under the AECA to purchase or lease defense articles. This could potentially include Patriot or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or services, or the ability to receive credits or guarantees relating to any purchase or lease. ----------------- IMPORTS FROM IRAN ----------------- -- In addition to our information related to the export of arms material to Iran, we also understand some of the same Turkish firms involved in the exports are interested in procuring arms material from Iran. -- Specifically, we understand that in September 2009, Mercan Tanitim was pursuing a deal with MKEK to import 2,000 kg of Composition A-4 military plastic explosives produced by Parchin Chemical Industries, an Iranian government military company and an element of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). -- We further understand that in September 2009, the Turkish companies Kolorkim Kimya San and Mercan Tanitim were considering a deal to import nitrocellulose (NC) from Iran. NC is a dual-use material that serves as a major component in smokeless gunpowder. -- As a subordinate of DIO, Parchin acts on behalf of DIO, importing and exporting chemical goods throughout the world. In April 2007, Parchin Chemical Industries was identified as the final recipient of sodium perchlorate monohydrate, a chemical precursor for solid propellant oxidizer, possibly to be used for ballistic missiles. -- As you know, DIO is one of seven Iranian nuclear-related entities designated for an asset freeze in the Annex to UNSCR ¶1737. In addition to being listed in the Annex for UNSCR 1737, DIO was sanctioned previously by the United States for WMD- or missile-related activities under the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act (ISNA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, and the Export Administration Act. -- We would further note that Parchin Chemical Industries has been designated for an asset freeze under UNSCR 1747 and U.S. E.O. 13382 in July 2008 as a consequence of its work on behalf of Iran's ballistic missile program. We, therefore, urge you, per UNSCR 1747, to freeze any assets of Parchin Chemical Industries that may come under Turkish jurisdiction. -- We would like to inform you that Turkish firms engaged in business with entities designated under E.O. 13382 are eligible for sanctions if such activities are not halted. -- Given the UN Security Council's grave concern over Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program activities, we urge you to encourage all Turkish firms to avoid any affiliation with this company. -- Iran, a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism, has a long history of providing arms and other military equipment to terrorist groups and other non-state actors, including in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. We are concerned that the materials being negotiated for transfer by the Turkish companies in question could be diverted by Iran to such groups. -- Iran has long supplied non-state actors, including terrorist groups such as Hizballah, with arms and other military equipment. The terrorist applications of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) are obvious, but Iran has also supplied terrorists with larger weapons systems that threaten regional security and stability. -- Failure to prevent these sales could result in the re-transfer of military material and explosives by Iran to groups like al-Qaida, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Taliban. This would harm the Turkish government's reputation as a NATO ally and demonstrated opponent of terrorism, and would reflect badly on the Turkish business community. -- These transactions could also be damaging to our bilateral relationship as these items can be used to kill and severely injure Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region. -- Turkey is also required to prevent the transfers from Iran as noted in UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, which prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory any "arms or related materiel." All states are required to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran. -- We believe the arms and explosives acquisitions being pursued by Mercan Tanitim and MKEK with Iranian entities would clearly violate this provision of UNSCR 1747, and that the Kolorkim and Mercan Tanitim deal involving the transfer of nitrocellulose may as well. -- Action to prevent such transfers would clearly demonstrate Turkey's commitment to the full and effective implementation of UNSCR 1747. Such action would also remove the possibility that these firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). -- We strongly urge you to investigate this information and prevent any transfers being contemplated by the entities involved by using authorities available under Turkish domestic law. -- Please share with us the results of your investigation at your earliest convenience. END POINTS --------------------- REPORTING REQUIREMENT --------------------- ¶9. (U) Post is requested to please report results of its efforts as soon as possible. ----------------- POINTS OF CONTACT ----------------- ¶10. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are Margaret T. Mitchell and Michael Rolleri of ISN/CATR, and Matthew Hardiman, EUR/PRA. CLINTON
According to widespread rumorS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000175 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2019 TAGS: PREL ETRD SNAR ECON AJ TU RU IRSUBJECT: IRAN'S MONEY LAUNDERERS, SANCTIONS-BUSTERS, AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARD MONEY MAKERS: A BAKU SAMPLER REF: A) BAKU 139 B) BAKU 132 C) BAKU 80 D) 2008 BAKU 917 Classified By: POLECON CHIEF ROB GARVERICK, REASON 1.5 (B and D) Summary --------- ¶1. (S) According to widespread rumor, many Iranians in Baku are involved full- or part-time in Iranian regime-related profit making, sanctions-busting, money laundering, and similar activities. Activities range from assisting Iranian interests "on the side" of pursuing private activities, to working primarily for Iranian government entities. These Iranians' formal businesses in Azerbaijan include factories, construction companies, trading companies, and shops, some of which may be hollow companies hiding illicit or semi-licit activities. Some are also said to be significant actors in obtaining spare parts and equipment for the Revolutionary Guard, raising revenues and managing money for it and/or regime figures, or managing Iran-origin narcotics trafficking. The list is a "sampler" of the types of personnel and activities singled out to Iran watcher by multiple sources as actively involved in Iranian regime-supportive financial and procurement activities. The list suggests the extensive and complex interconnection of Iranian figures and activities that reportedly support Iranian security organizations and regime figures. End Summary. ¶2. (S) Baku Iran watcher received the information below from a wide variety of independent Iranian and Azerbaijani sources (strictly protect), including Baku-based Iranian students, business figures, and human rights activists; a Tehran-based Iranian exporter; a prominent businessman working in Iran; the Executive Director of AmCham in Azerbaijan; an Azerbaijani oil company executive; and a local partner in a leading international management consulting firm. In almost all cases the information below was related/confirmed separately by at least three of the above sources. ¶3. (S) Please note that, while serious efforts have been made to cross-check the information below and ignore "indirect" claims, Iran watcher has no independent ability to verify these allegations. Although some of these figures are well known in Baku and/or among the resident Iranian community, Baku Iran watcher has never met any of them. The information below should be interpreted in this context. ¶4. (S) Begin List: ¶A. (S) Jamal Allavi. Three Iranian sources claimed that Allavi is a close relative of the ex-Mayor of Ardebil, and a former colleague/friend of President Ahmedinajad. He now runs several Iranian companies (mostly trading), and is the head of a provincial cooperative organization "Tavanee Marzneshinan Fedayan Velayat," entitled to export and import items with reduced restrictions. Allavi has a house in Baku and frequently travels on business to Azerbaijan, Russia, China, and Kazakhstan. He uses his businesses as a cover for procuring and importing military spare parts and other items needed by the Revolutionary Guard and other Iranian security forces, bribing customs officials as necessary. A fourth Iranian source noted that, while he did not know Allavi, the company name is a "giveaway" of Revolutionary Guard/regime connections. ¶B. (S) FNU "Lotfi". Runs a large artificial leather factory in Ardebil ("Kharkhaneye Charmeh Masnui)", and other businesses based in Iranian Azerbaijan. He is a close associate of Jamal Allavi (entry "A" above), with whom he cooperates in smuggling activities. He is an officer in the Revolutionary Guard (possibly retired), and his businesses are actually Revolutionary Guard-owned. He travels to Malaysi, Singapore, Dubai, Turkey, and Iraq as well as zerbaijan on Revolutionary Guard business. He als assists Revolutionary Guard and/or Iranian intelligence operations by "getting for them what they need," including communications equipment and technical information. ¶C. (S) Adil Sharabiani. An Iranian currency exchange dealer with "close links" to Tehran. He was formerly a manager of BAKU 00000175 002 OF 004 Bank Melli Iran, and currently has a close business relationship with the Xalq Bank, a medium-sized bank in Baku. He came to Azerbaijan after going bankrupt in Iran under murky circumstances. He is wealthy and reportedly works closely with the Iranian "Foundation for the Oppressed" (Banyadeh Mostazafan), overseeing its business and investment activities in Azerbaijan, and advising the management of the Foundation-owned Darya Soap Detergent company in Azerbaijan (headed by one "Farzandeh"). He also assists another Iranian foundation that is providing financial assistance to Azerbaijani refugees from Karabagh with up to 300 Manat per family per month (about $350). An Iranian contact said that a friend had recently witnessed Sharabiani delivering five million dollars in cash "from Iran" to the Bank of Baku that was not entered on the books. The Iranian source did not know whether the money represented a personal payment to Sharabiani or a disbursement entrusted to him for some other purpose. The anti-regime source alleged that Sharabiani "periodically" makes such deliveries to the Bank. An Iranian businessman separately told Iran watcher that Sharabiani has "very good relations" with the Iranian government, and is widely assumed by other Iranians to be assisting both regime organizations and individual regime/clerical figures in investment and money laundering activities. Note: The Xalq Bank was established using former staff of the Bank of Baku (see 'E" below). It is one of the most popular Baku banking venues in Azerbaijan for Iranian businesses and Iranians in Iran. Two other popular banks for Iranians are the "Royal Bank of Baku," owned by an Iranian-American (ref C), and the "Bank of Baku." End Note). ¶D. (S) Kamal Darvishi. This individual and his three brothers were famous fighters during the Iran-Iraq war. Kamil rose to the rank of General in the Revolutionary Guard, and formerly had important Teheran-area security and intelligence duties. He and his brother Keyoumars began coming to Azerbaijan regularly ten years ago. Although from a very poor family, they are both extremely wealthy. Kamal owns several road and other infrastructure construction companies in Iran, and formerly effectively controlled much of this sector in Iran (according to a Teheran businessman, "no roads in Iran could be built without him or his friends as a partner.)" Darvishi formerly ran the "NASR" company, an alleged Revolutionary Guard-controlled business in Iran. Some of his business activities and networking reportedly aroused suspicion, resulting in his official "retirement" from the Revolutionary Guard. In recent years Darvishi has developed a close business relationship/friendship with Azerbaijan Minister of Transportation Ziya Mammedov, and with Mammedov's assistance has won at least eight major road construction and rehabilitation contracts, including contracts for construction of the Baku-Iranian Astara highway, the Baku-Guba highway, and the BaQ ring highway. (Comment: We assume Mammedov is a silent partner in these contracts. Mammedov's immediate family owns Azerbaijan's largest commercial development company, and he is notoriously corrupt even for Azerbaijan. Iran watcher has heard many allegations from Azerbaijani contacts of creative corrupt practices involving highway construction here. End Comment). Iranian business and student contacts asserted that Darvishi maintains close relations with the Revolutionary Guard and Iranian intelligence. Two noted that he travels freely abroad, in violation of ten-year legal limitations on personal foreign travel by retired senior Revolutionary Guard officers. An Iranian student reported that Darvishi is recruiting among Iranian students in Azerbaijan for work in a new company he is establishing here. ¶E. (S) Jamsheed "Jushkar" Mahmudoglu. He and his brothers are Iranian Azerbaijanis who have obtained Turkish citizenship. They are large shareholders in the Bank of Baku, which is sometimes presented as a "Turkish bank." They are originally from Tabriz, where the family were wealthy gold and currency dealers who lost their business after the Iranian Revolution. The family fled to Turkey and ultimately BAKU 00000175 003 OF 004 obtained Turkish passports. Their business deals in Azerbaijan and Iran are frequently entwined with the Oromi brothers, another former Tabrizi-now-Turkish family active in Azerbaijan and Iran. They and the Oromis set up the Silsila General Trading company in Dubai under the aegis of the NAB Group. In Iran they jointly own a company which produces boilers on license from a German company (Bosch). In Azerbaijan they cooperated in the establishment of the Baku Electronics company and the Bank of Baku (the latter in partnership with the family of former Minister of Economic Development Farhad Aliyev, see below). Unlike the Oromis, Jamsheed reportedly remains a major shareholder in this bank. Two Iranian sources repeated "rumors" that this son is working with a son of Ayatollah Rafsanjani in several business ventures. Jamsheed has relations with prominent Azerbaijani and Iranian business and government figures, and allegedly does favors for Iranian government personnel, including facilitating of desired foreign items and money laundering. The President of AmCham in Baku (protect) confirmed that Jamsheed is a major bank shareholder, and originally from Iran. She nd other sources opined that the bank is one of he more "professionally run" in Baku. (Comment: The bank is known for its relations with Turkish companies. The Bank of Baku was formerly controlled by the brother of Farhad Aliyev, a former Azerbaijani Minister of Economic Development who is currently jailed. According to a prominent Azerbaijani business consultant (strictly protect), Aliyev's position has been divided between the Azerbaijani Minister of Transportation Ziya Mammedov, and the Head of Presidential Security, Vahid Akhundov. End Comment). ¶F. (S) Shahram Oromi. An Iranian Azerbaijani who obtained Turkish citizenship after the Iranian revolution. Nonetheless, he attended university in Iran, graduating from Iran Azad university (1993). He and his brothers Nadir and Bahram established the "Turkish" NAB Foreign Trade company (Deesh Ticaret Limited Sherkati) in 1988. The company (headquartered in Istanbul) does extensive trading between Turkey and the Middle East and Iran. It is active in Azerbaijan, and also present in Russia and other CIS countries. Since 1995 this company has been the distributor of Hyundai cars in Azerbaijan, and a member of the family is reportedly the Agent for Samsung in Turkey and Azerbaijan. The consultant describes the Oromi brother's business mode as based on "establishing insider monopolies or advantages via relations with powerful government individuals and their relatives" in the various countries in which they operate, "using bribes, 'gifts,' or offers of a share in their business." The Oromis helped set up the Bank of Baku (see item "E' above), and Shahram served in various positions (ranging from Chief of the Financial Audit Department to Chairman) between 1999-2007, however they have recently sold most of their shares in this bank to influential Azerbaijanis. The Oromi's allegedly work cooperatively in areas requested by senior Iranian figures, and several of their businesses may facilitate regime (or regime member) interests. Shahram was and remains close to former Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Ahmed Qazai. ¶G. (S) "Asgar" LNU (commonly known in Baku as "Agaya Asgar). His private company is located at #16 Gorbanov Street in Baku, next to the Nizami metro station. His formal business is Iran-Russia timber and wood products export/import via Azerbaijan. A native of Iranian Azerbaijan, Asgar has an Azerbaijani wife and has lived in Baku for several years. He works closely with political officers based at the Iran Culture House (ref B). His wife is the cousin of the Azerbaijani Minister of Education Misir Mardanov, and Mardanov's brother is one of his business partners. Irada Afetgizi, an Iranian who helped organize an anti-Israel "Islamic world" conference held at the Baku Media Center in 2007, works in his office. Asgar owns two homes in Baku and hosts visiting Iranian clerics and relatives of Iranian regime officials and senior Revolutionary Guard officers. He has close ties to Iranian government and Revolutionary Guard organizations and individuals, and assists them in business activities. He often travels to Moscow. ¶H. (S) Jabrail Naveed "Azerbaijani." A famous "fixer" for BAKU 00000175 004 OF 004 Iranians in Azerbaijan (hence his nickname). He was head of the Iranian Trader's Association in Azerbaijan until that organization closed in the late 1990's. An Iranian manufacturer and exporter from Tehran who has known the family for years (strictly protect) noted that "he is very wealthy, but doesn't flaunt it." He said that Naveed's wife formerly worked in Iran as an officer in Bank Melli, where she facilitated loans to unqualified regime bigwigs and their cronies. Three contacts separately claimed that Naveed has facilitated Iran-related energy business ventures with the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), and illicitly exports (falsely labeled) Pelite and other oil drilling materials and chemicals and propane gas. Naveed also reportedly owns the "Pingvin" iron workshop in Azerbaijan. The Tehran businessman said that Naveed helps facilitate import of sanctioned products into Iran from Russia and elsewhere via the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakchevan, and said that he himself is one of "many" legitimate Iranian exporters who have been pressured into cooperating in this activity. Naveed is a close friend of the head of Baku's Husseiniya ("Iranian") mosque, Mullah Ogagnejad, and oversees the mosques' administration. Ogagnejad is a son-in-law of the late Ayatollah Meshkini, and the personal religious representative of Ayatollah Khameini in Azerbaijan (ref B). ¶I. (S) Safa Naveed. Son of Jabrail Naveed (above). A graduate of Baku's Kavkaz university, he is currently a Revolutionary Guard officer working at the Iranian Embassy in Baku. He is a leadliaison with Iranian students in Azerbaijan. AnIranian student described Safa's duties as "spyig on" Iranian students in Baku, and an Iranian businessman who has known the family for years told Iran watcher that Safa Naveed has frequently boasted to him about his and Iran's knowledge of what goes on in Azerbaijan, extensive information networks here, and "ability to get anything it needs." One contact described Safa as "fanatically anti-Western." ¶J. (S) Asgar Jabbari. One of the "two Asgars" widely known among Iranians in Baku (see "F" above). Son of the late "Mullah Natiq," a famous hard-line orator during the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. Jabbari's wife is from Azerbaijan, he owns a house here, and travels back and forth regularly between Iran and Azerbaijan. His main official business is exporting Iranian marble from Isfahan, where he works with a large factory, which is actually a Revolutionary Guard front company (Note: Iranian marble is commonly used in Baku residential and office-building construction, which has been undergoing a boom here until recently. End Note.) Jabbari has close business relationships with senior Iranian government officials, and carries out business activities and buys real estate on their behalf. (Note: Jabbari's name is of Arabic origin, but is more likely to imply religious piety than Arabic heritage. End Note). ¶K. (S) Sabir Shaheen. Though reportedly mild-mannered and well dressed, Shaheen is a well known mafia-like figure from Iranian Azerbaijan who reportedly acts as a "liaison" between the Iranian and Russian/Azerbaijani narcotics traffickers. Although he officially operates a marble store on Baku's Karl Marx street, the store is generally closed and Shaheen himself is generally seen holding court at restaurants and cafes along 28 May Street. (Note: Iran reportedly has one of the highest per capita rates of heroin addiction in the world, and heroin and other narcotics trafficking from Iran to Russia and Europe via Azerbaijan has skyrocketed over the last two years. See ref (D). End List. DERSEMP Wants Probe into Reported 'Lisbon Hotel Prostitute Party'
Civil Georgia, Tbilisi / 24 Nov.'10 / 13:37
yeah right, whatever they say
They bring 80 whores into one of Lisbon's finest hotels by getting them to pose as delegates. Meanwhile people back home are setting fire to themselves in the streets, and so many unemployed sex workers in Georgia - and even fewer opportunities for them outside of Georgia, just can't complete with the Russians.
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22885
A lawmaker from parliamentary minority called on November 24 for a probe into a report by the Portuguese press, according to which the Georgian delegation, visiting Lisbon for NATO summit, hired dozens of prostitutes for a party in a hotel where the delegation was staying.
Mikheil Machavariani, the vice-speaker of the Parliament suggested that the newspaper report was part of Russia-backed anti-Georgian propaganda and an attempt to overshadow Georgia's recent diplomatic successes.
==
.1) Why do you think this is a corruption scandal? Unlike some of the other ACDI projects like the ones in Georgia and Afghanistan, USAID has not provided ACDI with the authority nor the financing to actually make any loans or to be actively involved in the lending process. In this case they are nothing more than glorified seminar presenters and teachers trying to put together meetings and seminars to bring the actual lenders who do make the loans and the sources of private capital to the seminars with the hope they will talk to one another.
They are taking credit for the fact these organizations are working together, for which they had nothing in reality to do with the actual transaction or the process, but in typical USAID fashion, they have to tout the fact that they "had successes" because people in the industry who every reason to be talking to one another anyway actually did hook up.
The scam is that they are trying to spin the fact their "seminars" had anything to do with it, and that their $6 million from USAID therefore has a leveraging factor. Obviously they are hoping USAID will give them more money to do more of the same. These people they are inviting know more about microfinance than ACDI will ever know since they are 'in' the business so having ACDI doing seminars is just another way of wasting more USAID money.
2) "Why don't you send this to Der Speigel magazine?
I am sure that NATO/EU did not want to agree to 4 more years in Afghanistan in Lisbon, for no country has the money or the voting public in favor of even four more months. To expose corruption in USAID would be like jelly beans to make the German public demand to pull out of Afghanistan. Then get a contract or promise of payment and write up a much more detailed and factual expose for them, not just the word "corruption" and Rusty Shultz, ACDI/VOCA over and over."
I am sure that NATO/EU did not want to agree to 4 more years in Afghanistan in Lisbon, for no country has the money or the voting public in favor of even four more months. It seems that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been milked by the same players, along with credit associations.
Normicro's vision is to be a sustainable and leading organization in alleviating poverty through providing broad access to credit in Azerbaijan. Normicro promotes viable enterprises for internally displaced and low-income Azerbaijanis by providing sustainable lending services.
Here are points of contact that know all the details, and much effort has been made on the part of the Norweigan government to clean up another Eldar Jafarov mess, and he seems to have some rather high level corruption from the first family
1) Why do you think this is a corruption scandal? Unlike some of the other ACDI projects like the ones in Georgia and Afghanistan, USAID has not provided ACDI with the authority nor the financing to actually make any loans or to be actively involved in the lending process. In this case they are nothing more than glorified seminar presenters and teachers trying to put together meetings and seminars to bring the actual lenders who do make the loans and the sources of private capital to the seminars with the hope they will talk to one another.
They are taking credit for the fact these organizations are working together, for which they had nothing in reality to do with the actual transaction or the process, but in typical USAID fashion, they have to tout the fact that they "had successes" because people in the industry who every reason to be talking to one another anyway actually did hook up.
The scam is that they are trying to spin the fact their "seminars" had anything to do with it, and that their $6 million from USAID therefore has a leveraging factor. Obviously they are hoping USAID will give them more money to do more of the same. These people they are inviting know more about microfinance than ACDI will ever know since they are 'in' the business so having ACDI doing seminars is just another way of wasting more USAID money.
2) "Why don't you send your information to Der Speigel magazine?
I am sure that NATO/EU did not want to agree to 4 more years in Afghanistan in Lisbon, for no country has the money or the voting public in favor of even four more months. To expose corruption in USAID would be like jelly beans to make the German public demand to pull out of Afghanistan. Then get a contract or promise of payment and write up a much more detailed and factual expose for them, not just the word "corruption" and Rusty Shultz, ACDI/VOCA over and over."
BTW, it seems that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also been milked by the same players, along with credit associations and lots of IDPs. Normicro's vision is to be a sustainable and leading organization in alleviating poverty through providing broad access to credit in Azerbaijan. Normicro promotes viable enterprises for internally displaced and low-income Azerbaijanis by providing sustainable lending services.
Much effort has been made on the part of the Norweigan government to clean up another Eldar Jafarov mess, and he seems to have some rather high level corruption from the first family. Please be warned of what you are dealing with.
ding process. In this case they are nothing more than glorified seminar presenters and teachers trying to put together meetings and seminars to bring the actual lenders who do make the loans and the sources of private capital to the seminars with the hope they will talk to one another.
They are taking credit for the fact these organizations are working together, for which they had nothing in reality to do with the actual transaction or the process, but in typical USAID fashion, they have to tout the fact that they "had successes" because people in the industry who every reason to be talking to one another anyway actually did hook up.
The scam is that they are trying to spin the fact their "seminars" had anything to do with it, and that their $6 million from USAID therefore has a leveraging factor. Obviously they are hoping USAID will give them more money to do more of the same. These people they are inviting know more about microfinance than ACDI will ever know since they are 'in' the business so having ACDI doing seminars is just another way of wasting more USAID money.
Not sure I see any place for any corruption in that, however!!!