U.S. gov't media claims WikiLeaks is being attacked by hackers

Notice how the U.S. gov't media claims WikiLeaks is being attacked by hackers:

Joni Simonshvili

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/WikiLeaks-Site-Under-Attack-Again-Promises-Major-Release-on-US-Bank--111049494.html

The thing is, "hackers", as in "computer hackers" that target major corporations and governments, would be *on* the side of WikiLeaks, not the other way around, as the VOA claims. The only side that would be "hacking" wikileaks is the gov't.  If "hackers" are doing it, then they are employed by the U.S. gov't. 

Oh, by the way, wasn't the "U.S. government" [supposed] to have been governed by 'the people'?  When, why, and how did it become the enemy of 'the people'?  

This all reminds me of Goldstein and 1984 - the present system of siddemination of information to the public – not only in the US but internationally more closely resembles the Orewellian state, where misinformation and disinformation are deliberately broadcasted in the former of a "Newspeak" language, which has been stripped bare of any political content.

In many parts of the world, as in Egypt, Georgia and Azerbaijan (to name just a few) – many media outlets operate out of fear – if they are now operating at all under the former business model. Take for instance in Georgia with Georgian Public TV and Rustavi2, both considered as official mouthpieces of the state. They are actively involved in conveying the government's official perspective – devoid of actual news and commentary.

Even the recent WikliLeak story is not totally understood  - as thus far, extensive redaction and blanking out the names of State Dep's informants in Tbilisi, on the grounds that it would endanger the lives of their assets, is commonplace – and without more openness – the impact in actually being able to change US foreign policy will be limited.  

Wikileaks hasn't really started publishing yet. From what I've heard of interviews with editors of the NYT and others, there is a dialogue process where Assange & co gets advice from newspapers about how much to redact. The Times advised Wikleaks to redact the names of informants from NGOs and media. Therefore, nobody should  expect who to know who the spies and murderers of PM are in Tbilisi and other places in the world.

cablegate.wikileaks.org georgia

China's ambassador to Kazakhstan, Cheng Guoping, thought in June last year that Russia will use military force to overthrow Saakashvili, and that Burjanadze will become next president. He says Condi Rice encouraged Saakashvili to attack:

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09ASTANA982.html

Netanyahu on arms deals with Georgia and S-300:

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10MOSCOW392.html

Some things just don't add up, and as one American shared recently, "come on man, these are little bon bons that were combed over by intel before being released by intel to their little monkey op, Julian Assange.

There are many reasons to conclude that WikiLeaks is a CIA/NSA controlled leak operation. Here are just a few:

1. WikiLeaks curator Assange is a free man. The U.S. black-bags people around the country with no evidence whatsoever on some vague suspicions of anti-U.S. behavior or sentiments. Revokes passports of US citizens, Yet, while claiming Assange has leaked classified military information, Assange has not even been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury.

2. The U.S. could easily seize Assange's computers and also has the technical ability to shut off access to his sites, but that hasn't happened.

3. The U.S. has the ability to track every breath Assange takes, but has not definitively discovered Assange's sources.

4. It is VERY unlikely that a PFC (or any other single individual) would have access to the wide variety of data attributed to one individual source in each of these major leaks, let alone the ability to remove that data from military computer systems.

5. The WikiLeaks disclosures are obviously "cleaned" -- they lack anything truly sensational, including the types of sensational information that close observers know to exist.

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Turkey Trusted American Partner in Arms Trading with Iran

S E C R E T STATE 015856  SIPDIS  E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2035 TAGS: ETTC MARR MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER MASS TU IRSUBJECT: (S) TURKISH FIRMS ENGAGED IN MILITARY MATERIEL-RELATED DEALS WITH IRAN  Classified By: EUR/PRA Director Stephanie Miley  ¶1. (U) This is an action request to Embassy Ankara. Please see paragraph 7.  ---------- BACKGROUND ----------  ¶2. (S) The U.S. has information about several transactions involving Turkish firms planning to export and import from Iran arms and related material controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement. Specifically, Iran is interested in procuring Full Metal Jacket (FMJ) .38 caliber and wadcutter bullets; 40 mm automatic grenade launchers; 5.56 mm composite magazines (for M16 assault rifles), and 7.62 X 39 mm and 7.62 X 51 mm composite magazines from Turkey. In addition, we understand that a Turkish firm may also be pursuing a deal to import plastic explosives and nitrocellulose from Iran.  ¶3. (S) The U.S. wants to provide this information to Turkish officials, request that they investigate this activity and use all available means to prevent these firms from exporting and importing such arms to and from Iran. In addition to any domestic Turkish authorities that may apply, these activities may also be in violation of both United Nations Security Resolution (UNSCR) 1747 and U.S. domestic authorities.  ¶4. (S) UNSCR 1747: UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory any "arms or related materiel." It also requires all states to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran. The procurement of plastic explosives from Iran would violate UNSCR 1747.  ¶5. (S) The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA): INKSNA authorizes sanctions against any foreign person that transfers to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria goods, services, or technology controlled by multilateral control lists (e.g., Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, or Wassenaar Arrangement); of the same kind as those on multilateral control lists, but falling below the control list parameters, when it is determined that such goods, services, and technologies have the potential to make a material contribution to WMD, or cruise or ballistic missile systems; on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that are not on multilateral lists; or with the potential of making a material contribution to WMD, or cruise or ballistic missile systems. Accordingly, the U.S. is concerned that if the Turkish firms proceed with transferring the grenade launchers, bullets, and ammunition magazines, we would be required to report this to the U.S. Congress and the Turkish firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions.  ¶6. (S) The U.S. is also concerned about the potential exports to Iran because one of the items may be of U.S. origin. According to Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) records, Turkey received 181 MK-19 40 mm grenade launchers from the United States in 1995. However, we do not know definitively if any of these are among the 40 mm grenade launchers contemplated as part of the sale to Iran. We note, however, that if any U.S.-origin defense equipment (including technical data) is re-transferred to Iran, that would violate Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). As a consequence, Turkey could lose its country eligibility under the AECA to purchase or lease defense articles, including Patriot or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or services, or to receive credits or guarantees relating to any purchase or lease.  ------------------------- ACTION REQUEST/OBJECTIVES -------------------------  ¶7. (S) Post is requested to approach GOT officials to pursue the following objectives and to deliver the talking points/non-paper in paragraph 8 below as appropriate:  -- Thank Turkish officials for Turkey's continued cooperation and support in preventing the transfer of arms or related material to and from Iran;  -- Inform the GOT that we are very concerned that Turkish firms may be exporting to and importing from Iran arms and related material;  -- Note that the export of Wassenaar Arrangement controlled items to Iran could require a report to the U.S. Congress under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) and may result in sanctions being imposed on the entities and individuals involved;  -- Point out that the import of arms or related material from Iran would violate UNSCR 1747, which prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory any "arms or related materiel" and requires all states to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals;  -- Emphasize this is not the time for business as usual with Iran;  -- Remind the GOT that both the DIO and Parchin were designated for an asset freeze under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, respectively, and were sanctioned by the U.S. under Executive Order (E.O.) 13382;  -- Strongly urge the GOT to use available legal authorities, including appropriate domestic laws and authorities related to implementing UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, to immediately terminate these deals and freeze any assets of DIO;  -- Note that Iran has a long history of providing arms and other military equipment to terrorist groups and that these items could easily end up in the hands of al-Qaida, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Taliban;  -------------- TALKING POINTS --------------  ¶8. (S//REL TURKEY) Begin talking points:  -- We appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued cooperation and support in preventing the transfer of military equipment and related materiel to and from Iran.  -- In the spirit of this cooperation, we want to share with you some additional information about Turkish firms involved in dealings concerning arms and related materiel with Iran.  --------------- EXPORTS TO IRAN ---------------  -- We have information that the Turkish firms Mercan Tanitim Dis Ticaret ve Muhendislik Ltd. and Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) may sign a contract to export military material to Iran.  -- The items covered by the contract include: FMJ (Full Metal Jacket) .38 caliber and wadcutter bullets; 40 mm automatic grenade launchers; 5.56 mm composite magazines (for M16 assault rifles), and 7.62 X 39 mm and 7.62 X 51 mm composite magazines, all of which are specified on the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List.  -- In addition, according to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) records, Turkey received 181 MK-19 40 mm grenade launchers from the United States in 1995. We do not know, definitively, if any of these were among the 40 mm grenade launchers contemplated as part of the sale to Iran.  -- We should note, however, that if any U.S.-origin defense equipment (including technical data) is re-transferred to Iran, that transfer would violate Section 3 of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act (AECA). As a consequence, Turkey could lose its country eligibility under the AECA to purchase or lease defense articles. This could potentially include Patriot or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or services, or the ability to receive credits or guarantees relating to any purchase or lease.  ----------------- IMPORTS FROM IRAN -----------------  -- In addition to our information related to the export of arms material to Iran, we also understand some of the same Turkish firms involved in the exports are interested in procuring arms material from Iran.  -- Specifically, we understand that in September 2009, Mercan Tanitim was pursuing a deal with MKEK to import 2,000 kg of Composition A-4 military plastic explosives produced by Parchin Chemical Industries, an Iranian government military company and an element of the Defense Industries Organization  (DIO).  -- We further understand that in September 2009, the Turkish companies Kolorkim Kimya San and Mercan Tanitim were considering a deal to import nitrocellulose (NC) from Iran. NC is a dual-use material that serves as a major component in smokeless gunpowder.  -- As a subordinate of DIO, Parchin acts on behalf of DIO, importing and exporting chemical goods throughout the world. In April 2007, Parchin Chemical Industries was identified as the final recipient of sodium perchlorate monohydrate, a chemical precursor for solid propellant oxidizer, possibly to be used for ballistic missiles.  -- As you know, DIO is one of seven Iranian nuclear-related entities designated for an asset freeze in the Annex to UNSCR ¶1737. In addition to being listed in the Annex for UNSCR 1737, DIO was sanctioned previously by the United States for WMD- or missile-related activities under the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act (ISNA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, and the Export Administration Act.  -- We would further note that Parchin Chemical Industries has been designated for an asset freeze under UNSCR 1747 and U.S. E.O. 13382 in July 2008 as a consequence of its work on behalf of Iran's ballistic missile program. We, therefore, urge you, per UNSCR 1747, to freeze any assets of Parchin Chemical Industries that may come under Turkish jurisdiction.  -- We would like to inform you that Turkish firms engaged in business with entities designated under E.O. 13382 are eligible for sanctions if such activities are not halted.  -- Given the UN Security Council's grave concern over Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program activities, we urge you to encourage all Turkish firms to avoid any affiliation with this company.  -- Iran, a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism, has a long history of providing arms and other military equipment to terrorist groups and other non-state actors, including in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. We are concerned that the materials being negotiated for transfer by the Turkish companies in question could be diverted by Iran to such groups.  -- Iran has long supplied non-state actors, including terrorist groups such as Hizballah, with arms and other military equipment. The terrorist applications of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) are obvious, but Iran has also supplied terrorists with larger weapons systems that threaten regional security and stability.  -- Failure to prevent these sales could result in the re-transfer of military material and explosives by Iran to groups like al-Qaida, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Taliban. This would harm the Turkish government's reputation as a NATO ally and demonstrated opponent of terrorism, and would reflect badly on the Turkish business community.  -- These transactions could also be damaging to our bilateral relationship as these items can be used to kill and severely injure Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region.  -- Turkey is also required to prevent the transfers from Iran as noted in UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, which prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory any "arms or related materiel." All states are required to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran.  -- We believe the arms and explosives acquisitions being pursued by Mercan Tanitim and MKEK with Iranian entities would clearly violate this provision of UNSCR 1747, and that the Kolorkim and Mercan Tanitim deal involving the transfer of nitrocellulose may as well.  -- Action to prevent such transfers would clearly demonstrate Turkey's commitment to the full and effective implementation of UNSCR 1747. Such action would also remove the possibility that these firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).  -- We strongly urge you to investigate this information and prevent any transfers being contemplated by the entities involved by using authorities available under Turkish domestic law.  -- Please share with us the results of your investigation at your earliest convenience.  END POINTS  --------------------- REPORTING REQUIREMENT ---------------------  ¶9. (U) Post is requested to please report results of its efforts as soon as possible.  ----------------- POINTS OF CONTACT -----------------  ¶10. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are Margaret T. Mitchell and Michael Rolleri of ISN/CATR, and Matthew Hardiman, EUR/PRA. CLINTON

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IRAN'S MONEY LAUNDERERS, SANCTIONS-BUSTERS, AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARD MONEY MAKERS: A BAKU SAMPLER

According to widespread rumorS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000175  NOFORN SIPDIS  E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2019 TAGS: PREL ETRD SNAR ECON AJ TU RU IRSUBJECT: IRAN'S MONEY LAUNDERERS, SANCTIONS-BUSTERS, AND REVOLUTIONARY GUARD MONEY MAKERS: A BAKU SAMPLER  REF: A) BAKU 139 B) BAKU 132 C) BAKU 80 D) 2008 BAKU  917  Classified By: POLECON CHIEF ROB GARVERICK, REASON 1.5 (B and D)  Summary ---------  ¶1. (S) According to widespread rumor, many Iranians in Baku are involved full- or part-time in Iranian regime-related profit making, sanctions-busting, money laundering, and similar activities. Activities range from assisting Iranian interests "on the side" of pursuing private activities, to working primarily for Iranian government entities. These Iranians' formal businesses in Azerbaijan include factories, construction companies, trading companies, and shops, some of which may be hollow companies hiding illicit or semi-licit activities. Some are also said to be significant actors in obtaining spare parts and equipment for the Revolutionary Guard, raising revenues and managing money for it and/or regime figures, or managing Iran-origin narcotics trafficking. The list is a "sampler" of the types of personnel and activities singled out to Iran watcher by multiple sources as actively involved in Iranian regime-supportive financial and procurement activities. The list suggests the extensive and complex interconnection of Iranian figures and activities that reportedly support Iranian security organizations and regime figures. End Summary.  ¶2. (S) Baku Iran watcher received the information below from a wide variety of independent Iranian and Azerbaijani sources (strictly protect), including Baku-based Iranian students, business figures, and human rights activists; a Tehran-based Iranian exporter; a prominent businessman working in Iran; the Executive Director of AmCham in Azerbaijan; an Azerbaijani oil company executive; and a local partner in a leading international management consulting firm. In almost all cases the information below was related/confirmed separately by at least three of the above sources.  ¶3. (S) Please note that, while serious efforts have been made to cross-check the information below and ignore "indirect" claims, Iran watcher has no independent ability to verify these allegations. Although some of these figures are well known in Baku and/or among the resident Iranian community, Baku Iran watcher has never met any of them. The information below should be interpreted in this context.  ¶4. (S) Begin List:  ¶A. (S) Jamal Allavi. Three Iranian sources claimed that Allavi is a close relative of the ex-Mayor of Ardebil, and a former colleague/friend of President Ahmedinajad. He now runs several Iranian companies (mostly trading), and is the head of a provincial cooperative organization "Tavanee Marzneshinan Fedayan Velayat," entitled to export and import items with reduced restrictions. Allavi has a house in Baku and frequently travels on business to Azerbaijan, Russia, China, and Kazakhstan. He uses his businesses as a cover for procuring and importing military spare parts and other items needed by the Revolutionary Guard and other Iranian security forces, bribing customs officials as necessary. A fourth Iranian source noted that, while he did not know Allavi, the company name is a "giveaway" of Revolutionary Guard/regime connections.  ¶B. (S) FNU "Lotfi". Runs a large artificial leather factory in Ardebil ("Kharkhaneye Charmeh Masnui)", and other businesses based in Iranian Azerbaijan. He is a close associate of Jamal Allavi (entry "A" above), with whom he cooperates in smuggling activities. He is an officer in the Revolutionary Guard (possibly retired), and his businesses are actually Revolutionary Guard-owned. He travels to Malaysi, Singapore, Dubai, Turkey, and Iraq as well as zerbaijan on Revolutionary Guard business. He als assists Revolutionary Guard and/or Iranian intelligence operations by "getting for them what they need," including communications equipment and technical information.  ¶C. (S) Adil Sharabiani. An Iranian currency exchange dealer with "close links" to Tehran. He was formerly a manager of  BAKU 00000175 002 OF 004   Bank Melli Iran, and currently has a close business relationship with the Xalq Bank, a medium-sized bank in Baku.  He came to Azerbaijan after going bankrupt in Iran under murky circumstances. He is wealthy and reportedly works closely with the Iranian "Foundation for the Oppressed" (Banyadeh Mostazafan), overseeing its business and investment activities in Azerbaijan, and advising the management of the Foundation-owned Darya Soap Detergent company in Azerbaijan (headed by one "Farzandeh"). He also assists another Iranian foundation that is providing financial assistance to Azerbaijani refugees from Karabagh with up to 300 Manat per family per month (about $350).  An Iranian contact said that a friend had recently witnessed Sharabiani delivering five million dollars in cash "from Iran" to the Bank of Baku that was not entered on the books. The Iranian source did not know whether the money represented a personal payment to Sharabiani or a disbursement entrusted to him for some other purpose. The anti-regime source alleged that Sharabiani "periodically" makes such deliveries to the Bank. An Iranian businessman separately told Iran watcher that Sharabiani has "very good relations" with the Iranian government, and is widely assumed by other Iranians to be assisting both regime organizations and individual regime/clerical figures in investment and money laundering activities.  Note: The Xalq Bank was established using former staff of the Bank of Baku (see 'E" below). It is one of the most popular Baku banking venues in Azerbaijan for Iranian businesses and Iranians in Iran. Two other popular banks for Iranians are the "Royal Bank of Baku," owned by an Iranian-American (ref C), and the "Bank of Baku." End Note).  ¶D. (S) Kamal Darvishi. This individual and his three brothers were famous fighters during the Iran-Iraq war. Kamil rose to the rank of General in the Revolutionary Guard, and formerly had important Teheran-area security and intelligence duties. He and his brother Keyoumars began coming to Azerbaijan regularly ten years ago. Although from a very poor family, they are both extremely wealthy. Kamal owns several road and other infrastructure construction companies in Iran, and formerly effectively controlled much of this sector in Iran (according to a Teheran businessman, "no roads in Iran could be built without him or his friends as a partner.)"  Darvishi formerly ran the "NASR" company, an alleged Revolutionary Guard-controlled business in Iran. Some of his business activities and networking reportedly aroused suspicion, resulting in his official "retirement" from the Revolutionary Guard. In recent years Darvishi has developed a close business relationship/friendship with Azerbaijan Minister of Transportation Ziya Mammedov, and with Mammedov's assistance has won at least eight major road construction and rehabilitation contracts, including contracts for construction of the Baku-Iranian Astara highway, the Baku-Guba highway, and the BaQ ring highway. (Comment: We assume Mammedov is a silent partner in these contracts. Mammedov's immediate family owns Azerbaijan's largest commercial development company, and he is notoriously corrupt even for Azerbaijan. Iran watcher has heard many allegations from Azerbaijani contacts of creative corrupt practices involving highway construction here. End Comment).   Iranian business and student contacts asserted that Darvishi maintains close relations with the Revolutionary Guard and Iranian intelligence. Two noted that he travels freely abroad, in violation of ten-year legal limitations on personal foreign travel by retired senior Revolutionary Guard officers. An Iranian student reported that Darvishi is recruiting among Iranian students in Azerbaijan for work in a new company he is establishing here.  ¶E. (S) Jamsheed "Jushkar" Mahmudoglu. He and his brothers are Iranian Azerbaijanis who have obtained Turkish citizenship. They are large shareholders in the Bank of Baku, which is sometimes presented as a "Turkish bank." They are originally from Tabriz, where the family were wealthy gold and currency dealers who lost their business after the Iranian Revolution. The family fled to Turkey and ultimately  BAKU 00000175 003 OF 004   obtained Turkish passports. Their business deals in Azerbaijan and Iran are frequently entwined with the Oromi brothers, another former Tabrizi-now-Turkish family active in Azerbaijan and Iran. They and the Oromis set up the Silsila General Trading company in Dubai under the aegis of the NAB Group. In Iran they jointly own a company which produces boilers on license from a German company (Bosch). In Azerbaijan they cooperated in the establishment of the Baku Electronics company and the Bank of Baku (the latter in partnership with the family of former Minister of Economic Development Farhad Aliyev, see below). Unlike the Oromis, Jamsheed reportedly remains a major shareholder in this bank.  Two Iranian sources repeated "rumors" that this son is working with a son of Ayatollah Rafsanjani in several business ventures. Jamsheed has relations with prominent Azerbaijani and Iranian business and government figures, and allegedly does favors for Iranian government personnel, including facilitating of desired foreign items and money laundering. The President of AmCham in Baku (protect) confirmed that Jamsheed is a major bank shareholder, and originally from Iran. She nd other sources opined that the bank is one of he more "professionally run" in Baku. (Comment: The bank is known for its relations with Turkish companies. The Bank of Baku was formerly controlled by the brother of Farhad Aliyev, a former Azerbaijani Minister of Economic Development who is currently jailed. According to a prominent Azerbaijani business consultant (strictly protect), Aliyev's position has been divided between the Azerbaijani Minister of Transportation Ziya Mammedov, and the Head of Presidential Security, Vahid Akhundov. End Comment).  ¶F. (S) Shahram Oromi. An Iranian Azerbaijani who obtained Turkish citizenship after the Iranian revolution. Nonetheless, he attended university in Iran, graduating from Iran Azad university (1993). He and his brothers Nadir and Bahram established the "Turkish" NAB Foreign Trade company (Deesh Ticaret Limited Sherkati) in 1988. The company (headquartered in Istanbul) does extensive trading between Turkey and the Middle East and Iran. It is active in Azerbaijan, and also present in Russia and other CIS countries. Since 1995 this company has been the distributor of Hyundai cars in Azerbaijan, and a member of the family is reportedly the Agent for Samsung in Turkey and Azerbaijan. The consultant describes the Oromi brother's business mode as based on "establishing insider monopolies or advantages via relations with powerful government individuals and their relatives" in the various countries in which they operate, "using bribes, 'gifts,' or offers of a share in their business."  The Oromis helped set up the Bank of Baku (see item "E' above), and Shahram served in various positions (ranging from Chief of the Financial Audit Department to Chairman) between 1999-2007, however they have recently sold most of their shares in this bank to influential Azerbaijanis. The Oromi's allegedly work cooperatively in areas requested by senior Iranian figures, and several of their businesses may facilitate regime (or regime member) interests. Shahram was and remains close to former Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Ahmed Qazai.  ¶G. (S) "Asgar" LNU (commonly known in Baku as "Agaya Asgar).  His private company is located at #16 Gorbanov Street in Baku, next to the Nizami metro station. His formal business is Iran-Russia timber and wood products export/import via Azerbaijan. A native of Iranian Azerbaijan, Asgar has an Azerbaijani wife and has lived in Baku for several years. He works closely with political officers based at the Iran Culture House (ref B). His wife is the cousin of the Azerbaijani Minister of Education Misir Mardanov, and Mardanov's brother is one of his business partners. Irada Afetgizi, an Iranian who helped organize an anti-Israel "Islamic world" conference held at the Baku Media Center in 2007, works in his office. Asgar owns two homes in Baku and hosts visiting Iranian clerics and relatives of Iranian regime officials and senior Revolutionary Guard officers. He has close ties to Iranian government and Revolutionary Guard organizations and individuals, and assists them in business activities. He often travels to Moscow.  ¶H. (S) Jabrail Naveed "Azerbaijani." A famous "fixer" for  BAKU 00000175 004 OF 004   Iranians in Azerbaijan (hence his nickname). He was head of the Iranian Trader's Association in Azerbaijan until that organization closed in the late 1990's. An Iranian manufacturer and exporter from Tehran who has known the family for years (strictly protect) noted that "he is very wealthy, but doesn't flaunt it." He said that Naveed's wife formerly worked in Iran as an officer in Bank Melli, where she facilitated loans to unqualified regime bigwigs and their cronies.  Three contacts separately claimed that Naveed has facilitated Iran-related energy business ventures with the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), and illicitly exports (falsely labeled) Pelite and other oil drilling materials and chemicals and propane gas. Naveed also reportedly owns the "Pingvin" iron workshop in Azerbaijan. The Tehran businessman said that Naveed helps facilitate import of sanctioned products into Iran from Russia and elsewhere via the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakchevan, and said that he himself is one of "many" legitimate Iranian exporters who have been pressured into cooperating in this activity. Naveed is a close friend of the head of Baku's Husseiniya ("Iranian") mosque, Mullah Ogagnejad, and oversees the mosques' administration. Ogagnejad is a son-in-law of the late Ayatollah Meshkini, and the personal religious representative of Ayatollah Khameini in Azerbaijan (ref B).  ¶I. (S) Safa Naveed. Son of Jabrail Naveed (above). A graduate of Baku's Kavkaz university, he is currently a Revolutionary Guard officer working at the Iranian Embassy in Baku. He is a leadliaison with Iranian students in Azerbaijan. AnIranian student described Safa's duties as "spyig on" Iranian students in Baku, and an Iranian businessman who has known the family for years told Iran watcher that Safa Naveed has frequently boasted to him about his and Iran's knowledge of what goes on in Azerbaijan, extensive information networks here, and "ability to get anything it needs." One contact described Safa as "fanatically anti-Western."  ¶J. (S) Asgar Jabbari. One of the "two Asgars" widely known among Iranians in Baku (see "F" above). Son of the late "Mullah Natiq," a famous hard-line orator during the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. Jabbari's wife is from Azerbaijan, he owns a house here, and travels back and forth regularly between Iran and Azerbaijan. His main official business is exporting Iranian marble from Isfahan, where he works with a large factory, which is actually a Revolutionary Guard front company (Note: Iranian marble is commonly used in Baku residential and office-building construction, which has been undergoing a boom here until recently. End Note.) Jabbari has close business relationships with senior Iranian government officials, and carries out business activities and buys real estate on their behalf. (Note: Jabbari's name is of Arabic origin, but is more likely to imply religious piety than Arabic heritage. End Note).  ¶K. (S) Sabir Shaheen. Though reportedly mild-mannered and well dressed, Shaheen is a well known mafia-like figure from Iranian Azerbaijan who reportedly acts as a "liaison" between the Iranian and Russian/Azerbaijani narcotics traffickers. Although he officially operates a marble store on Baku's Karl Marx street, the store is generally closed and Shaheen himself is generally seen holding court at restaurants and cafes along 28 May Street. (Note: Iran reportedly has one of the highest per capita rates of heroin addiction in the world, and heroin and other narcotics trafficking from Iran to Russia and Europe via Azerbaijan has skyrocketed over the last two years. See ref (D).  End List. DERSE

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Probe into Lisbon Hotel Prostitute Party - and "Reality"

MP Wants Probe into Reported 'Lisbon Hotel Prostitute Party'
Civil Georgia, Tbilisi / 24 Nov.'10 / 13:37 

yeah right, whatever they say

They bring 80 whores into one of Lisbon's finest hotels by getting them to pose as delegates. Meanwhile people back home are setting fire to themselves in the streets, and so many unemployed sex workers in Georgia - and even fewer opportunities for them outside of Georgia, just can't complete with the Russians.

http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22885

A lawmaker from parliamentary minority called on November 24 for a probe into a report by the Portuguese press, according to which the Georgian delegation, visiting Lisbon for NATO summit, hired dozens of prostitutes for a party in a hotel where the delegation was staying.

Mikheil Machavariani, the vice-speaker of the Parliament suggested that the newspaper report was part of Russia-backed anti-Georgian propaganda and an attempt to overshadow Georgia's recent diplomatic successes.

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ACDI/VOCA Corruption Scandal, Reader Feedback, Azerbaijan

 1) Why do you think this is a corruption scandal?    Unlike some of the other ACDI projects like the ones in Georgia and Afghanistan, USAID has not provided ACDI with the authority nor the financing to actually make any loans or to be actively involved in the lending process.   In this case they are nothing more than glorified seminar presenters and teachers trying to put together meetings and seminars to bring the actual lenders who do make the loans and the sources of private capital to the seminars with the hope they will talk to one another.

They are taking credit for the fact these organizations are working together, for which they had nothing in reality to do with the actual transaction or the process, but in typical USAID fashion, they have to tout the fact that they "had successes" because people in the industry who every reason to be talking to one another anyway actually did hook up.

The scam is that they are trying to spin the fact their "seminars" had anything to do with it, and that their $6 million from USAID therefore has a leveraging factor.   Obviously they are hoping USAID will give them more money to do more of the same.    These people they are inviting know more about microfinance than ACDI will ever know since they are 'in' the business so having ACDI doing seminars is just another way of wasting more USAID money.

2) "Why don't you send this to Der Speigel magazine?

I am sure that NATO/EU did not want to agree to 4 more years in Afghanistan in Lisbon, for no country has the money or the voting public in favor of even four more months. To expose corruption in USAID would be like jelly beans to make the German public demand to pull out of Afghanistan. Then get a contract or promise of payment and write up a much more detailed and factual expose for them, not just the word "corruption" and Rusty Shultz, ACDI/VOCA over and over."

I am sure that NATO/EU did not want to agree to 4 more years in Afghanistan in Lisbon, for no country has the money or the voting public in favor of even four more months. It seems that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been milked by the same players, along with credit associations. 

 

Normicro's vision is to be a sustainable and leading organization in alleviating poverty through providing broad access to credit in Azerbaijan. Normicro promotes viable enterprises for internally displaced and low-income Azerbaijanis by providing sustainable lending services.

 

Here are points of contact that know all the details, and much effort has been made on the part of the Norweigan government to clean up another Eldar Jafarov mess, and he seems to have some rather high level corruption from the first family

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Feedback from readers, ACDI/VOCA Corruption Scandal, Azerbaijan

1) Why do you think this is a corruption scandal?    Unlike some of the other ACDI projects like the ones in Georgia and Afghanistan, USAID has not provided ACDI with the authority nor the financing to actually make any loans or to be actively involved in the lending process.   In this case they are nothing more than glorified seminar presenters and teachers trying to put together meetings and seminars to bring the actual lenders who do make the loans and the sources of private capital to the seminars with the hope they will talk to one another.

They are taking credit for the fact these organizations are working together, for which they had nothing in reality to do with the actual transaction or the process, but in typical USAID fashion, they have to tout the fact that they "had successes" because people in the industry who every reason to be talking to one another anyway actually did hook up.

The scam is that they are trying to spin the fact their "seminars" had anything to do with it, and that their $6 million from USAID therefore has a leveraging factor.   Obviously they are hoping USAID will give them more money to do more of the same.    These people they are inviting know more about microfinance than ACDI will ever know since they are 'in' the business so having ACDI doing seminars is just another way of wasting more USAID money.

2) "Why don't you send your information to Der Speigel magazine?

I am sure that NATO/EU did not want to agree to 4 more years in Afghanistan in Lisbon, for no country has the money or the voting public in favor of even four more months. To expose corruption in USAID would be like jelly beans to make the German public demand to pull out of Afghanistan. Then get a contract or promise of payment and write up a much more detailed and factual expose for them, not just the word "corruption" and Rusty Shultz, ACDI/VOCA over and over."

BTW, it seems that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also been milked by the same players, along with credit associations and lots of IDPs.  Normicro's vision is to be a sustainable and leading organization in alleviating poverty through providing broad access to credit in Azerbaijan. Normicro promotes viable enterprises for internally displaced and low-income Azerbaijanis by providing sustainable lending services.

Much effort has been made on the part of the Norweigan government to clean up another Eldar Jafarov mess, and he seems to have some rather high level corruption from the first family. Please be warned of what you are dealing with.

ding process.   In this case they are nothing more than glorified seminar presenters and teachers trying to put together meetings and seminars to bring the actual lenders who do make the loans and the sources of private capital to the seminars with the hope they will talk to one another.

They are taking credit for the fact these organizations are working together, for which they had nothing in reality to do with the actual transaction or the process, but in typical USAID fashion, they have to tout the fact that they "had successes" because people in the industry who every reason to be talking to one another anyway actually did hook up.

  The scam is that they are trying to spin the fact their "seminars" had anything to do with it, and that their $6 million from USAID therefore has a leveraging factor.   Obviously they are hoping USAID will give them more money to do more of the same.    These people they are inviting know more about microfinance than ACDI will ever know since they are 'in' the business so having ACDI doing seminars is just another way of wasting more USAID money.

Not sure I see any place for any corruption in that, however!!!

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Update Latest and “on-going” ACDI/VOCA Corruption Scandal in Azerbaijan

Update of Corruption Scandal

Name:" E. G. wrote by email several weeks ago: "I read your article from 7th September 2010. I agree with you in all you wrote and want to give you some facts about corruption among Eldar Jafarov, ACDI/VOCA and USAID in Azerbaijan.  Also materials about wheeler-dealer finance of Eldar Jafarov. Do you speak Russian? […]" 23.10.10."

As provide a few days ago:

Dear Joni:"Here is something you might want to look into, and how can I get in contact with you to give you more.  I was provided documents yesterday from Azerbaijan of a major fraud case involving USAID and credit unions, (perhaps some World Bank money too), involving approximately 3.5 million dollars.

I also have a copy of the letter sent to the US Embassy in Baku about this corruption - and it is alleged that the Credit Agro, which was established with US and World Bank money operated a pyramid system and gave fake rural credits to various organizations. This will not be the first major cover up of USAID in Azerbaijan and Georgia - and they have also been active in Iraq and Afghanistan, and even some of the same human resources. You know all about these things, even better than I do.

Currently Creditagro operates in 27 districts of Azerbaijan. Can you suggest how best to distribute this information - also - do you have anyone in DC that can go to ACDI/VOCA and get all the reports and complaints made under a FOIA request about alleged corruption in ACDI/VOCA for both Georgia and Azerbaijan. The point of contact would be Seth McDonald, Project Coordinator/Financial Services 202 469-6172 or Bill Polidoro, Chief Operating Officer, President Office.

A complain has been made to the US Embassy in Baku but there has been no reaction on their part, only closing ranks – and this is a pity, and more than 60 honest employees of the organization have been replaced as part of the cover of a massive corruption scandal.

Again, as with earlier complaints to ADCI/VOCA and the Office of Inspector General – the home office is telling that it is 'a non-meritorious claim, and there needs something to be investigated – not just generalities.'  The person at the center is Eldar Jafarov, and he has organized some kind of pyramid scheme and payments for credits are made by money from the organization and not the creditors themselves. The so-called world financial crisis was also used as a cover to write off some loans as bad when they were not. In many cases the loans were not even in arrears, and the purpose was to devalue the worth of the credit unions in order to privatize it at not to nothing.

I will let you connect the dots, as it is possible that there are other dark forces of such schemes and various scenarios. Employees of the credit union, "Credago" suggest to you that a commission should be set up that knows credit and finance, and this body consist of independent people (those not working for CredAgro) to carry out an audit.  Most of the corrupt loans were given out in the period 2007-2008, and the vast majority in the second half of 2007. It is clear that some other motivation was involved – as the change was sudden, credit policy, and this set up the conditions for the above-mentioned pyramid scheme, as an effort to reduce the risk and cook the books.  However, in spite that the risk exposure was brought down on paper, outstanding old debts continued unabated.

In order to try to shut up the staff of the credit unions, so to turn blind eye to illegal practices, promises were made to give some share of ownership when the credit unions were privatized.  Those that did not play along were forced to resign and in some instances, set up in cooperation with local enforcers in the government, and sent to jail on bogus charges. Naturally it would appear that there is direct government involvement in the fraud – as few would take such a risk of sending innocent people to jail unless they were well paid. The motivation is clear, not only for the director Eldar Jafarov, to bankrupt the organization, make as much money in the process by writing off loans, pocketing the money, along with corrupted officials and then to turn around and set fresh by privatizing the credit union and then to seek fresh international funding from various organizations such as the Word Bank, German Bank for Reconstruction and Development (KFW), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and others, especially the greatest milk cow of all – USAID."

NB: Background as earlier posted on this site:

Corruption in USAID Azerbaijan and ACDI/VOCA

On-going investigation of corruption in Azerbaijan and USAID

Name:" E. G. wrote by email today:  Content: "I read your article from 7th September 2010. I agree with you in all you wrote and want to give you some facts about corruption among Eldar Jaffarov, ACDI/VOCA and USAID in Azerbaijan.  Also materials about wheeler-dealer finance of Eldar Jafarov. Do you speak Russian? […]" 23.10.10."

Here is the case file on this investigation and it has many side plots and connection with funding mechanisms in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan.

Earlier Article from September 7, with all the sorted history.

Rats Everywhere, can you fill in the gaps?
Intercepted correspondence from USAID, OIG

RE: Everyone looks bad, so everyone looks the other way.'

"Can you please advise a telephone number and let me know of a few convenient times, which I may try to contact you in reference to the information about USAID programs and activities?"

Thank you,
KC Smith
Special Agent
USAID Europe & Eurasia
RIG Frankfurt, Germany
OFFICE: 49-69-7535-7845
FAX: 49-69-7535-7841
SmithKC2@state.gov

1) A source under contract to USAID, as employed business development expert, Mr. X, who may be the source on ADCI corruption with good access states the following: ACDI started a rural credit SME program funded by USAID about 2001 in Azerbaijan. It was the largest of the USAID funded credit projects. About $4 million was in loans. They made loans to rural enterprises, farmers, etc. They had offices in most areas of the country (Lenkoran, Imishli, Ganja, etc.) ACDI/VOCA, an international development organization dedicated to empowering people worldwide.4

2) However, regardless if this source will be forthcoming, he can give more information about the basis of Azerbaijan Business Assistance and Development Program (ABAD), and how things were flawed (how there was bid rigging, and how it was the contract was awarded to a group with weak organizational credentials in business development at best. You just need to look into how the project was solicited, and it may not have been a RFP, and the winner did not win in full and open competition, and thus USAID participated in corruption and did not acquire the services of the most capable technical assistance provider.

The ACDI system in Azerbaijan was established to provide local control and a local company was set up to run all the local offices. The company was called CreditAgro This system was unlike that in Georgia, where credit associations were formed. This was more centralized, with offices reporting to a central office in Baku. However, the same propensity to hand the operation over to corrupt locals was observed. In this case, ACDI/VOCA hired a man called Eldar Jafarov, initially as credit officer, but he eventually became head of CreditAgro. Soon problems developed between Eldar and the ACDI/VOCA Chief of Party and other expatriates, who considered that Eldar was taking too much power and hiring cronies for every position in CreditAgro. Despite numerous attempts by ACDI/VOCA expatriate staff to remove Eldar Jafarov these attempts were consistently blocked by ACDIVOCA Washington. An internal audit proved many allegations against Eldar. Still, ACDI/VOCA refused to fire Eldar or change human resource personnel practices.

In 2005, however, enough was enough and ACDI decided to fire Eldar. Then Eldar told all managers of Creditagro to go on strike in his support. As a result, ACDI/VOCA Washington completely caved in (ACDI's VP Dennis DeSantis), and gave the position back to Eldar. The fallout was immediate and the ACDI/VOCA Country Director resigned in disgust, [check out this source] and Eldar, now much more powerful, personally fired the other principal expatriate himself, cleaning up loose ends. The impression was that Creditagro was now a private enterprise of Eldar.

The United States Agency for International Development, USAID was well aware of this scandal but decided to turn a blind eye, and often sided with Eldar in subsequent criticism of ACDI/VOCA. However, they still made a grant of the USAID funds (about $4 million) to ACDI/VOCA/Credit Agro. ACDI continues to be the owner of CreditAgro, yet it forced into a curious position where they are telling all potential investors and lenders to stay clear of CreditAgro because of the above-mentioned shenanigans, and not to taint their reputation more than it is already.

It was obvious that ACDI/VOCA had really mishandled the project, setting up a private company serving one individual. Still, even though USAID was for a very long time aware of the problems, never penalized ACDI/VOCA, but instead, in 2005, rewarded ACDI/VOCA with a major rural enterprise development project in Azerbaijan, which is now employing the old second in command fired by Eldar.

 

Successful Track Record

This is not the first incidence of ACDI/VOCA incompetence in running credit projects. The Georgia ACDI rural credit project was a well-known complete disaster, as local credit associations created by ADCI and funded fully by USAID and USDA were taken over by the local managers selected by ACDI/VOCA and turned into a private money making racket with accountability to none. A later USAID project to assist these entities found out later that the managers had illegally fleeced the associations of most of their funds. Most of the funds disappeared as "dividends" to the local project managers, who normally had been selected due to their power within the local community (for example, some of them were heads of the local tax inspectorate and well known bandits, including members of state security, and not because of any credit or relevant knowledge.

Professional skills are not the decisive factor. The result is that senior local bureaucrats, politicians, and businessmen gain positions. This was part of the problem with the credit unions set up by ACDI/VOCA in 1993 and funded by the US government.

ACDI/VOCA hired these people ostensibly because their muscle could be used to guarantee repayment from poorer farmers. Even as far back as 1998 the then Agriculture Deputy Minister Nugzar Duchidze had remarked that ACDI/VOCA's setup was a "rich farmer's club designed to help these well connected individuals. The Georgia operation was obviously even worse than the Azerbaijan setup. Still, USAID encouraged the Azerbaijan operation was to be patterned after Georgia by the USAID program officers who controlled aid programs in both countries.

One International TV network producer wrote an email dealing with accountability in international organizations 'Ahh – there is the problem. Nobody is interested in corruption. Western agencies would be very embarrassed to be seen dealing with a bunch of second-rate crooks. After all, you must remember that it looks bad if your programme which is funded by the US or Europe has no correct oversight. Everyone looks bad, so everyone looks the other way.'

Nonetheless, it does appear that the US government and the Bush Administration were a bit concerned about the "total" lack of accountability NGOs (including a host of international organizations) have when receiving grants and cooperative agreements from USAID. These NGOs can do what they want, and are "assumed" to be doing well, because they are "fellow travelers" with USAID. They all claim to be helping in improving the livelihood of local farmers, small business, etc.

No noise was made of this incredible debacle of ACDI/VOCA in Georgia because none other than Rusty Schultz a very close friend of Gerry Anderson, high-ranking USAID official in Tbilisi, ran the ACDI/VOCA project in Georgia. Many sources (including a those close to a Chemonics run project of assistance to credit organizations) confirm that Anderson did everything in his power to protect Rusty and his corrupted minions. And finally because of their disastrous management, Jim Holderbaum, ACDI Country manager was lost as what to do. Many claim that those working in NGOs only to come to Georgia in order to get laid regularly, something Rusty was good at arranging. Then visiting experts had access to the Rusty castle where they could be entertained, and the rest is history.

Gerry Anderson, USAID Georgia, directly instructed even those visiting experts that were involved in proposal writing when he was in Georgia in mid-2001 that they needed to hook up with ACDI. Now that is interesting and what authority would Gerry have in making such recommendations? He was proposing to work with a specific group and the instructions were outlined in such a way in terms of value chains, and that the only clear choice was that ACDI as the company that they he needed to work with. A month or so later on other business, same instructions were provided to visiting experts to make sure that there was a connection with ACDI.

It should also be noted that ACDI/VOCA has a policy of putting on its payrolls mainly old USAID hands. That is why ACDI/VOCA is a favorite in all parts of USAID's world. Others need not apply. Financially ACDI/VOCA is a disaster, but it is doubtful that any of the board members have the brass to go against the entrenched senior employees, for whatever reason, and AgVantage is doing well as can be expected. SAVE, the original project in Georgia, which was renamed AgAdvantage and this project was doomed from the start because of the problems with ACDI. First their money problems: Then there was a lack of any clear direction or focus, other than to pander to Gerry Anderson and USAID.

It is clear that what happened is Azerbaijan and Georgia is par for the course; Gerry Anderson had gone to great pains to cover up USAID scandals and to protect his friends. What is less clear is the motivation. He has made sure that many project evaluations are stacked with the people that will come back with results that conform that all went well and program objectives were achieved. In one instance, he had bumped off a person from an evaluation that may not have brought back the desired results. Allegations of his morals are well documented, and there is a large age difference between him and his Asian mail order bride, and there are still allegations of sexual harassment of staff of USAID floating around Tbilisi (he demanding that some USAID staff works share in housekeeping responsibilities, such washing his plates).

Eventually it is known, as part of damage control Rusty Schultz, the program coordinator in Georgia, was sent to head up a high profile ACDI/VOCA operation in Iraq. It was clear that criminal activity had proliferated unchecked in the Georgia project and the cover up was complete. And still, with similar noise filtering out of the Azerbaijan project, and still USAID does nothing other than praise a bankrupt project and continue to dole the pork to an incompetent but rich organization.

Moreover, there are serious allegations of money being used to support the trafficking of weapons. One source shares the following: "If there was money going to arms I rather suspect it would have been more likely to have been connected to Rusty's sidekick, the New Zealander mercenary who had been all over Africa and Asia soldiering in places they would pay. I heard lots of stories about how he and Rusty got hooked up, but I suspect all of them were at least partial fabrications just to make both of them look good."

There are many stories in Tbilisi about how he and Rusty got hooked up, but in all likelihood most of them were at least partial fabrications just to make both of them look good. The bottom line, Rusty needed the soldier of fortune (he may have officially been his deputy but it is difficult to say if he had that title) because he made the parties and the stories so much more fun for Rusty to use to encourage people like Gerry that he wanted to co-opt the parties. Gerry is all about spin and control and the soldier wanted everyone to know that though he was in the background it was he who was still the one carrying the entire buzz.

The most notorious corruption in Georgia involved Micro and SME Credit activities in the South Caucasus countries of Georgia and Azerbaijan. It is hardly accidental that such programs have been so unsuccessful that there is even doubt if they were even intended to be effective from the very start.

How long can USAID continue to support an organization with such a record of negligence and criminal malfeasance as ACDI/VOCA and others? ACDI/VOCA continues to win all the contracts it wants and nobody brings their record to the public light. ACDI/VOCA works in approximately 40 countries and claims to foster vibrant communities, organizations and enterprises that can manage and finance themselves.

See acdivoca.org for more information. All this is a matter of record with USAID, OIG, Office of Inspector General.

This connects  many dot, and what is going on today, and what has gone on - where did the money come from and where did it go - and while the wool was being pulled over the eyes of the American People as they try to help Georgia and Azerbaijan develop.

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Trafficking of Weapons in Georgia and US Involvement

Weapon Trafficking in Georgia and Larger Games

Jeffrey K. Silverman

The headline is but the tip of the iceberg, "Saakashvili Protege Helped Lead Georgia to War With Russia

Steve LeVine, published this otherwise revealing headline November 1, 2010, on an investigative website, Main Justice, and a few snips are included here and there to compliment the commentary. 

However, for those who know this story from the big picture perspective – this is small stuff, and Davit Kererashvi, former Georgian Minister of Defense,  is but a fall guy as part of a larger network, and a pawn in a larger game. It is even possible that he may end up dead as part of the ongoing cover up, as too many larger players are implicated.

Steve Levin writes, "the 32-year-old Kezerashvili has lain low since leaving the defense post under heavy criticism following the August 2008 war, in which the armed forces that he and President Mikheil Saakashvili had carefully armed and trained fled the battlefield in panic."

This is far from the truth, solider fought and only the officers cut and ran, leaving the boots on the ground to fend for themselves, and even an order was given to withdraw when the war was actually going in the favor of Georgia. This story, as to Davit Kererashvili, and it quotes are part of a larger pattern, or perhaps just a reflection of trying to write remote articles without up close fact checking – and buying into the story line that one guy is somehow responsible  for the larger military and political debacle.

The Main Justice article continues that "Kezerashvili had relied in considerable part on relationships with Israel to build up Georgia's fighting capability. He attended high school in Israel in the early 1990s and became fluent in Hebrew."

No mention is made as how he had to escape Georgia in his youth to keep from being arrested for drug dealing and that his university days were marked by fits of rage, perhaps under the influence of drugs, and how he even threatened one of his female professors for refusing to put down high marks for him when he had not even attended lectures, and that was even before the so-called education reform and rooting out corruption in the system of higher education.

The weapons business in Georgia in multi-faceted, and has been booming in Georgia for many years, and with direct knowledge and US involvement. The Georgian-Russian war of 2008 only provided the opportunity to bring us up to speed on the larger scale of things, including funding mechanisms, and now many US defense contractors are involved in this lucrative and deadly business.  It is about location and topography, and it is clear that Kezerashvili is but a pawn in this game and only need to look at who will be appointed as the next Ambassador to the United States as part of the damage control, Jakobashvili, Minister for Territorial Reintegration – and how is that possible with his links with the traders of weapons and Israeli players. There are also links to other Georgian Jews with sorted histories.

As a cover for the lost of many weapons, including those pre-positioned here for eventual use against Iran. the drumbeat was to be expected. – "territorial integrity" – restoring constitutional order and overcoming the lawlessness in the breakaways of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  It was clear from on-site visits behind the Russian lines during the war of August 2008 that far more weapons stockpiles fell into Russian hands than admitted, and this begs the question as why were they stationed there in the first place.  This was the first real on-site confirmation of the illegal procurement and distribution network that involves many countries in the trafficking and illicit trade of weapons.

It is still officially debatable whether the vast amount of weapons were intended for Georgain defensive purpose or just part of a larger shell game of producers and end users who find that the situation in Georgia is perfect for trans-shipments of weapons to other conflict zones outside of the region. One of the key players, with links with Vicktor Bout and Serbia is the Melvale Corporation, which is a well-known intermediary company for this trade.  This black market dealer of weapons works under the umbrella of contracts concluded before the last Minister of Defense was even aware of the business opportunities in his new job.

It also confirms that links between Russian Military intelligence and Georgian plants, not low level agents but those who are fixed in key positions in the Georgian defense establishment.  The main point in some of the end user certificates is from where any full-fledged investigation should start, and not on the surface of some commissions trading hands but where did the shipment to Georgia actually end up. "The end user of the cargo herwith guarantees that the cargo as described will not be given, re-exported, lent, rented or [gifted] t other persons, subjects or countries without the written consent of the authorized organs of Georgian and Jordan. Moreover, the Georgian Ministry of Defense further guarantees to accept the materials in its warehouses and to keep them under its security after the delivery to Georgia.?

 

Does that mean placing them in villages, near schools and other places to be captured by the Russians, as was the case during the war of August 2008, and if captured – then no laws have been violated in the terms of the certificate of end user, and if now they end up on the international market, only the Russians and South Ossetians can be blamed. The paperwork cannot be clearer, "After accepting the cargo, the Ministry of Defense will confirm the delivery in writing through a certificate to the supplier, confirming the realization of the delivery."

It is understood why Saakashvili posted a slimy and unless drug user as the top man in the Ministry of Defense, again quoting from the recent Main Justice Story, "Returning to his native Georgia, Kezerashvili formed a friendship with Saakashvili, who was making his way as a young politician after earning a law degree in the United States. As Saakashvili rose, so did his young protégée.

I would beg to differ, and "when Saakashvili was justice minister under Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgia's first post-Soviet president, Kezerashvili served as head of his information department. He served as an assistant to Saakashvili when the latter was chief of the Tbilisi city council. And when Saakashvili formed a new political party in 2001 â the United National Movement and Kezerashvili became a founding member.

The president elect knew this persons capabilities well – and how he would provide the perfect cover in case anything would go wrong, the perfect scapegoat, and when push came to shove that he could run to Israel and not be deported, as it is illegal to deport a Jew from the homeland.  The Main Justice Article only tells part of the story, and the rest can be confirmed by human rights watchdogs.    The semi-true part describes, "leading up to the August 2008 war, Israel provided niche materiel and training to Georgia. According to the respected Israeli newspaper.  Haaretz, Israeli weapons and training cost Georgia some $500 million from 2000 through 2008. They included pilot less drones and night-vision equipment, in addition to tactical and urban warfare training starting at the end of 2007."

What about the m-85 cluster bombs sold to Israel, many of them being duds – and how there was a wholesale failure of the accompanying "grad" style multi-launch system that brought these cluster bombs down on the heads of Georgian soldiers and civilians like – and outside of the direct zone of conflict, and where they were claimed to have been used. The concerted effort by the Georgian government to blame this on the Russians is well documented dating back to 2008 but the official story has never held water.

HR watch and the Georgian human rights center confirmed the use of cluster bombs outside of the region of the Roki tunnel and it is clear that this has never been investigated as a war crime.  It is also debatable, as daring and educated, having cheated his way through the university – threatening a female aged professor with violence is this Kezerahvli, and how can such a statement as this be made in the Main Justice Article, "Then, in 2006, Saakashvili elevated the just 28-year-old Kezerashvili to the defense portfolio. He said Kezerashvili was a young but daring, educated and firm.

The problems of Kezershvili are minor in comparison to the big picture, and how a so called US ally, Jordan is so much involved in the weapons trafficking – and as a result of the calculation to not win the war of August 2008, weapons that were sold to Georgia, mostly Serbian are being traded in the international market.

The unanswered question now is, why has so many weapons been sold to Georgia, at least on paper, where are they now, and how were they exported directly from Jordan" Few then and even fewer now, ever thought they were to be used for territorial integrity or training purposes. One may speculate some other possibilities:  Iran, Northern Iraq (Kurdistan), and points beyond. This is only the beginning of the list of end users and interesting stakeholders.

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Georgia in crossfire of arms trafficking

Georgia in crossfire of arms trafficking

Joni Simonshvili

It is becoming clear that Georgia continues to be on the cutting-edge of the international arms business, and not just what is being done by some rouge independents, such as Viktor Bout – AKA "Merchant of Death" but close allies of the United States and potential NATO countries. How is it possible that those in such a position of trust can be so tied up in the international trade in weapons?

For instance, based on recent reports by Main Justice, mainjustice.com

Bribery Probe of Arms Supply Industry Points to Georgia

By Christopher M. Matthews | November 1st, 2010

The U.S. Justice Department's FCPA investigation of corruption in the international defense supply industry is shining a light on the role Israeli brokers played in preparing the Caucasian republic of Georgia go to war against Russia in 2008. Georgian Ministry of Defense officials allegedly accepted bribes to purchase 21 million rounds of ammunition from a U.S. source. Three defendants in the FBI's massive FCPA sting case are implicated.

Saakashvili Protégé Helped Lead Georgia to War with Russia

By Steve LeVine | November 1st, 2010

Former Georgian Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili spent his teenage years in Israel. "I like weapons a lot. In my case, it is bladed weapons that I like. I have a favorite sword which I carry with me from one office to another," Kezerashvili told an interviewer in 2006, when President Mikhail Saakashvili elevated him to the defense post at age 28.

On the local beat these connections have been investigated by the remnant of any semblance of a free media, Maseto TV, and in an investigative serious earlier this year the following statements were noted:

"Victor Bout is a well-known international criminal who has successfully worked with such clients as Russian intelligence, FSB, and American Special Services. Such an opportunity has given him a free hand on the part of the government to do as he pleases. Georgia provides the green light for all sorts of illegal activities, and these involve power players on the National level.  Georgia is for them him the traffic light on permanent green for "anything goes". From the Georgian side, Victor has collaborated with Temur Alasania, Jemal Inaishvili, former head of a Georgian port, and others when asked about Davit Kezerashvili, former Minister of Defense, 'this boy is but your run-of-the-mill drug addict.'  There is no doubt that he is a player in this business, but to put in simple terms, he is only a small fish – a lower ranking player.  A working investigative commission needs to be set up to bring a halt to such activities. However, that is naïve – and to tell it like it is – everybody is interested in covering up these bloody tracks in the snow."

 

--Ucha Ninuashvili, Director of NGO "Center for Human Rights" GEORGIA:

"The United States still uses Georgia exactly for this kind of transport corridor just as the previous government of the US freely did. Not only based on this end user document, as supplied by Mr. Silverman, this document provides solid basis for such an announcement. However, we have other information as well that supports such claims, and we are working now in this direction. The other information which we have that Georgia has shows that Georgia been used for the transportation of the weapons to third countries, and these are likely African and Asian contacts".

Kakha Katsitadze, military and NATO expert:

"If there was any reasonable explanation, the government would come and tell us. I would allow myself to tell as no one can provide a reasonable explanation and in fact no reasonable explanation has ever been provided".

In connection with the weapons sales, other than the Thailand episode, Georgia appeared several more times, though the ends of all these threads got thrown into the informational vacuum.

Africa. Congo. September 7, 2007. In the air crash of "An-12" – killed  8 persons, including two Georgian citizens, including the pilot, Zurab Mosia, 55 years old and also a mechanical worker, and Artur Bagdasarov. No specific information ever about the cargo on board and only it has been mentioned that the airplane registered in the name of "Transaviaservice" – there was no license for the flights, and no safety inspection, since 2007.

Philippines. August 17, 2009. A ship flying the Panama flag was seized with 13 Georgian sailors. All suspected of weapon smuggling but only an American captain accepts responsibility.

Azerbaijan. Baku. March 17, 2010. Information agencies of Azerbaijan notify us that the officers of the National Safety Ministry arrested 8 members of a radical religious group, among them- the locals of Dagestan and Chechnya, which were planning these terrorist acts. A large amount of the weapons have been transported to Azerbaijan from Georgia.

United States of America. Washington. May 5, 2010. According to American information sources, this case, on corruption including facts of weapons smuggling, where the main suspect is Daniel Alvares, he is also charged with corruption related to weapons sales for Georgian government members.

United States of America. Washington, DC. May 6, 2010. The General Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the USA Robert Muller is in Tbilisi.  Muller had a meeting with the Minister of Internal Affairs – Vano Merabishvili and Minister of Justice- Zurab Adeishvili. Both meetings were held behind closed doors. The visit of the General Director of FBI to Georgia lasted for several hours.

Jeffrey Silverman, Georgian human rights activist

"The Russian side knows what the Americans are doing and the other way around too! Meanwhile everyone is making money off Georgia. This country is a free market for them, and they try to hide their bloody tracks. Let no one forget about August 8, 2008 when a large quantity of American supplied weapons were abandoned behind Russian lines. These ended up in the hands of the Russians. However, what is not told is that this equipment was not intended for use by the Georgians but had been prepositioned for use against Iran.  This military equipment was not delivered for the Georgians. Georgia imports weapons not only from Israel but also from Jordan and Serbia. The Georgians are also purchasing weapons from the Russians".

Silverman documents the strange actions by the Ministry of Defense by end user certificates issued by the Ministry of Defense of Georgia.

Article one: The user and the address of the user – Ministry of Defense of Georgia. 20, General Kvinitadze Street, Tbilisi, Georgia, 011

Article two: Exporter and the address of the goods – KAADB, PO 927932. Oman, Jordan.

Article three: The mediator and the address: "Melvel Corporation Olayage" Trade center, Francis Rakel Street, city Victoria. Mahe, Seychelles Islands.

Article four: Importer of the goods and the address: Ministry of Defense of Georgia. 20,General Kvinitadze Street, Tbilisi, Georgia, 0112.

In the final documentation, the most part of the points in the end-user certificated describe the terms and condition of Russian designed weapons. The document was signed by the Deputy Minister of Defense of Georgia, Mamuka Mujiri, who, by the way, was in the list of the escaped high ranked persons during the Russian-Georgian war from the 7th to the 14th of August, 2008. There was nothing strange in the document, except maybe these details:

First: the Georgian Ministry of Defense led the negotiations with the company founded in Jordan in the Russian language. This document concluded in Russian that Jordan had been counted as an official partner of the United States of America. According to the negotiation language, as a registered company in Jordan, a military partner country of America, which also has Russian management? Ironically, according to the list of the Directors on the KADDB official webpage we couldn't find any Russian surname.

"Melvel Corporation"- named as the mediating company in the document we have for the weapons importation, whose main activity is the sale of scrap metal. Though it is not a secret for anyone, especially for the media, that "Melvel" is busy in the weapons business, its' Director, Slobodan Teshic,  according to information spread by the media and internet means, the "Seychelles"  company "Melvel" is also in Belgrad. Teshic, according to the source, is in both legal and illegal sales of weapons. For example, the weapon transfers to Iraq are under his name. The company is very busy with sales of scrap metal, named by the Ministry of Defense of Georgia as the mediator, and he is charged in terrorism, anti-human activity in the process of weapons purchases by foreign sources.

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Bio storage - weapons labs in Georgia: Bechtel National and US government again involved in a witch’s brew?

Tbilisi biolab - why worry?

Georgian authorities have built a new laboratory on the outskirts of Tbilisi near the international airport, assisted by American defense authorities, such as Bechtel National and various subcontractors. It is suppose to be associated with bird flue and a bio storage facility of Soviet era germs but few fully buy into that story. Something is going on - not because of the official nature of the facility but because of the cock and bull stories being written about it that insults anyone's intelligence.

1)      What kind of lab is it, and why has there been so much speculation about it?

2)      It lies at a place called Alekseevka, an abandoned Soviet military base, today a suburb with a few thousand people living within a mile of the new building.

3)       Is it purely defensive, as the U.S. government and Bechtel National claims, or some more sinister – or is research being carried out on some of the most terrifying weapons ever created

I think for something like this the only place is a news service looking for a feature or a documentary. I am trying to piece the information together, one source writes, "The safety woman was American, name of Carol, but I can't remember much else about what you mention below. And then there was a Brit that used to run a bar, he got a fat contract to go and fix all the bad welds for the bio stew vats, tubing and even the structural steel of the building was not to standard.

Now that got me scratching my head on that one. As another source recalls, "there was a Turk contractor working with various projects in Tbilisi, who set up his own company and did some work for Bechtel, but that's as much as I can remember. I remember a job and that was a long time ago for someone to go in there in some sort of monitoring or evaluation role, but that's as much as I can remember. I don't know anyone who actually took that position."

I have been asking around and the story is that while they have 'archived' the weapons stuff, the facility - as all such research is about counter/response to biological/chemical agents, so getting ready for anthrax type attacks and the angle is counter terrorism preparedness. However, and here is the interesting catch, to build counter-agents you have to first have the weaponized or 'infecting' agent, which means they have to predict what someone might use (so the archive they got is important for this) and then build a counter-agent."

So to make an analogy, you need cobra venom before you can manufacture the anti-venom. I so as is the case with all dual-use technology there is the potential here, and in developing wider defense strategy such 'capacity' is taken into account. I - and friends - however believe that there is little chance that the US would keep such high security information as would be contained in the archive in such a precarious location. Maybe they do some research as a part of the wider program and maybe it's a place to set up early warning, or something that needs a lab close to Russian or Central Asian territory - what link might there be to Iraq here, or Afghanistan?

However, in government circles this is not considered exceptionally sinister or clandestine either. But the public might feel different I suspect....! There is the important caveat though, as you well know the genie is out of the bottle with this stuff so I personally would expect a government to prepare for an attack. Lots of nutters around who would love to hit the US or UK, etc, talk about panic if they were able to pull it off!

Anyway, I will see what I can dig up. There is actually a lot out there about this facility, it is in a few books as well, that cover biological weapons and terrorism and historical writing about the Cold War. Some of the material is rather dated, take for instance an blog entitle Bechtel: skeletons in the Iraqi cupboard that speaks about what everybody knows, Bechtel's involvement in making of chemical weapons – its direct involvement in chemical weapons programs, as reported about 20 years ago in the financial times during the ongoing investigation of the notorious Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, the Italian bank clandestinely funding the arms-to-Iraq programme with the secret involvement of sections of the then Bush administration.

Bechtel was the lead contractor for the PC2 petrochemical complex, producing chemicals with dual civil-military use including a precursor used in mustard gas. The deal was up and running after the Kurds were gassed at Halabja in 1988, the incident frequently cited as justification for this year's war to topple Saddam.  It should be noted the connection between former Secretary of State, having been a Bechtel board member, and Georgia. The nexus between Bechtel and the Iraqi chemical weapons program are well documented, in spite of all efforts, to bury the information, as reported in the German newspaper Die Tagezeitung and was widely reported, and described all the dealings about the company that Supplied Iraq's Weapons Program.

Out of a total of 24 US companies and their area of involvement. Number 21 is Bechtel, shown as involved in the chemical weapons program. Bechtel had another finger in the Iraqi pie during the 1980's. They sought, without success as it turned out, to build an oil pipeline via Jordan to Aqaba, intended to carry a million barrels per day of Iraqi exports. The deal was to be financed through the US Exim Bank. The current Defense Sec. Donald Rumsfield lobbied Saddam for permission while the White House pressured the Exim Bank. Details are given in a report from the Institute for Policy Studies, which "reveals that the diplomatic pressure from Rumsfeld and the Reagan administration happened during and despite Hussein's use of chemical weapons. Behind the scenes, these officials worked for two years attempting to secure the billion dollar pipeline scheme for the Bechtel Corporation."

Clearly, the highest levels of the administration placed tremendous importance on the Aqaba pipeline project. On June 19, 1984, the Eximbank's Board met and not surprisingly approved a preliminary commitment of $484 million for the Aqaba pipeline for Bechtel. It is no wonder that EXIM Bank does not complete with private sector lenders as the private sector would be unable to accept the risk and legal ramifications of such deals, and in terms of political and commercial risks, and that they could be deemed as terrorist involved in biological warfare.

Under normal peaceful circumstances, as such project as funded by the EXIM would not be economically viable, or morally acceptable – and if done locally, the masses would be screaming "not in my backyard." However, to play about with bio agents in Georgia is like what has been done in Iraq with the Kurds – and who will be the next white rabbits. It is doubtful if there will be much fanfare unless there is a pile of bodies with a US and Bechtel flag waving on top of it – a gift of the American People and Bechtel National.

 

 

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Export credits, drugs and international weapons “wheeling and dealing”, not Victor Bout

Export credits, drugs and international weapons "wheeling and dealing", not Victor Bout

The real breaking news is already know, and it has nothing to do with petty traders and the latest headlines, "Alleged arms dealer Viktor Bout whisked to America Viktor Bout, a former Russian Air Force officer accused of being one of the world's biggest illicit arms traffickers, was handed over to the US by Thai officials. It is more likely at attempt at damage control and to keep under wraps the extent of the involvement of various US government agencies and friendly governments in the tangle network of arms trafficking – and arms for drug swaps that make the wheeling of dealing of Lt. Col Oliver North and Iran-Contra look like small potatoes in comparison.  We must not forget the nexus to another friend of America and those hounds that run with the likes of KBR and other defense contractors, as North had a very close relationship with Noriega.

A turn of a shovel on the Internet put today's extradition of Viktor Bout, the poster child weapons trafficker in proper perspective. North emerged as the central figure in the infamous Iran-contra affair.  Under a grant of immunity he testified before Congress in July, 1987. He was convicted (1989) on criminal charges arising from the affair, but his conviction was later reversed on the grounds that immunized testimony had been used at his trial. In 1994, North was the Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate from Virginia, but he lost the election. Since 1995 he has hosted radio and television programs. North has written Mission Compromised (2002), a semiautobiographical novel of Washington intrigue.

It makes you wonder what lies ahead for Viktor Bout and if he has so many friends in such high places. Victor might even end up as a delegate to the UN.  The real Merchants of Death are those that are the closest of friends, NATO, US and the UK, and why are we not hearing about them in the news.  Take for information what was being said just a few years ago, BAe uses export import credits and moves to DC. The Exim Bank of White House vicinity fame is like giving fire to a pyromaniac! How much of the British arms race and British Aerospace [BAE] military global is made possible through the Exim Bank loans? THE GUARDIAN newspaper of London has written much on the export certification and bank loan scandals they have had the misfortune of bringing heaps of attention upon themselves. BAE is now more a presence near the Pentagon in the weapons loop around Washington DC than a member of the Airbus Consortium of Europe!

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_46/b3959161.htm

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Export credits, drugs and international weapons “wheeling and dealing”, not Victor Bout

The real breaking news is already know, and it has nothing to do with petty traders and the latest headlines, "Alleged arms dealer Viktor Bout whisked to America Viktor Bout, a former Russian Air Force officer accused of being one of the world's biggest illicit arms traffickers, was handed over to the US by Thai officials. It is more likely at attempt at damage control and to keep under wraps the extent of the involvement of various US government agencies and friendly governments in the tangle network of arms trafficking – and arms for drug swaps that make the wheeling of dealing of Lt. Col Oliver North and Iran-Contra look like small potatoes in comparison.  We must not forget the nexus to another friend of America and those hounds that run with the likes of KBR and other defense contractors, as North had a very close relationship with Noriega.

A turn of a shovel on the Internet put today's extradition of Viktor Bout, the poster child weapons trafficker in proper perspective. North emerged as the central figure in the infamous Iran-contra affair.  Under a grant of immunity he testified before Congress in July, 1987. He was convicted (1989) on criminal charges arising from the affair, but his conviction was later reversed on the grounds that immunized testimony had been used at his trial. In 1994, North was the Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate from Virginia, but he lost the election. Since 1995 he has hosted radio and television programs. North has written Mission Compromised (2002), a semi autobiographical novel of Washington intrigue.

It makes you wonder what lies ahead for Viktor Bout and if he has so many friends in such high places. Victor might even end up as a delegate to the UN.  The real Merchants of Death are those that are the closest of friends, NATO, US and the UK, and why are we not hearing about them in the news.  Take for information what was being said just a few years ago, BAe uses export import credits and moves to DC.

The Exim Bank of White House vicinity fame is like giving fire to a pyromaniac! How much of the British arms race and British Aerospace [BAE] military global is made possible through the Exim Bank loans? THE GUARDIAN newspaper of London has written much on the export certification and bank loan scandals they have had the misfortune of bringing heaps of attention upon themselves. BAE is now more a presence near the Pentagon in the weapons loop around Washington DC than a member of the Airbus Consortium of Europe!

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_46/b3959161.htm

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